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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 As with many other things, when it comes to mining, it 
is far better to be safe than sorry.  To monitor and encourage 
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safety, Congress and the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (“MSHA”) require that mine operators notify 
MSHA within 15 minutes after the occurrence of an injury 
having “a reasonable potential to cause death.” 
 
 This case involves that requirement, as embodied in 
both a statute and a regulation: 30 U.S.C. § 813(j) and 30 
C.F.R. § 50.10(b).  Robert Stern, a miner for Consol 
Pennsylvania Coal Company, LLC (“Consol”), suffered a 
crushing injury between two multi-ton pieces of mining 
equipment and quickly exhibited, among other worrying 
symptoms, signs of internal bleeding.  Without delay, Consol 
got Stern out of the mine and coordinated getting him to a 
hospital, but it failed to notify MSHA for about two hours.  
Consequently, MSHA issued a citation to Consol for violating 
30 C.F.R. § 50.10(b).  The Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Review Commission (the “Commission”) upheld the citation 
over Consol’s protestations. 
 
 Consol now petitions for review, challenging several 
aspects of the Commission’s decision.  We conclude that the 
Commission did not err, and we will therefore deny the 
petition. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the 
“Mine Act” or the “Act”), 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., was enacted 
“for the purpose of improving the working conditions of 
miners.”  Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & 
Health Review Comm’n, 717 F.3d 1020, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
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It created the agency that is now called MSHA and “gave [it] 
broad authority to ensure the safety of mines[.]”  Big Ridge, 
Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 715 F.3d 
631, 635 (7th Cir. 2013).  MSHA inspectors act on behalf of 
the Secretary of Labor and are empowered to issue citations for 
violations of the Mine Act or regulations promulgated under it.  
Cumberland Coal, 717 F.3d at 1021.  “A mine operator can 
contest a citation before the … Commission …, [which is] an 
adjudicative agency independent of the Department of Labor.”  
Sec’y of Labor v. Spartan Mining Co., 415 F.3d 82, 83 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
 
 The provision of the Mine Act primarily at issue here is 
30 U.S.C. § 813(j).  It says that, “[i]n the event of any accident 
occurring in any coal or other mine, the operator shall notify 
[MSHA1] … and shall take appropriate measures to prevent the 
destruction of any evidence which would assist in investigating 
the cause or causes thereof.”  Id.  When “the operator realizes 
that the death of an individual at the mine, or an injury or 
entrapment of an individual at the mine which has a reasonable 
potential to cause death, has occurred[,]” the notification must 
“be provided by the operator within 15 minutes[.]”  Id.  The 
15-minute requirement was added by the Mine Improvement 
and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (the “MINER 
Act”), Pub. L. No. 109-236, § 5(a), 120 Stat. 493, 498 (2006).  
It codified a similar provision that had previously appeared in 
                                              
1 The statute uses the term “Secretary,” 30 U.S.C. 
§ 813(j), referring to “the Secretary of Labor or his delegate[,]” 
id. § 802(a).  In this context, MSHA is the Secretary’s delegate.  
29 U.S.C. § 557a. 
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an MSHA emergency regulation.  S. Rep. No. 109-365, at 13 
(2006).  
 
Shortly after the MINER Act became law, MSHA 
promulgated a final regulatory version of the same notification 
requirement, codified at 30 C.F.R. § 50.10.2  Emergency Mine 
Evacuation, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,430, 71,430-31, 71,434-36 (Dec. 
8, 2006).  That regulation says that an “operator shall 
immediately contact MSHA at once without delay and within 
15 minutes at the toll-free number, 1-800-746-1553, once the 
operator knows or should know that an accident has occurred 
involving: … [a]n injury of an individual at the mine which has 
a reasonable potential to cause death[.]”  30 C.F.R. § 50.10(b). 
 
B. Factual Background 
On August 12, 2013, at about 3:15 a.m., Stern was 
crushed between two multi-ton pieces of mining equipment.  
The mine section supervisor, John McDonald, was notified of 
the accident within minutes, and he got to the scene three or 
four minutes later.  When he arrived, Stern told him that “he 
got pinched,” that “he was in a lot of pain[,]” that he could not 
move his legs, and that he could feel “the pinch” on one of his 
legs.  (App. at 242, 249.)  Stern also screamed in pain when his 
legs were moved.   
 
McDonald asked the mine “bunker to call 9-1-1 to get 
an ambulance running.”  (App. at 242.)  He also radioed for 
                                              
2 We refer to the rulemaking that established that 
regulation as the “post-MINER Act rulemaking.” 
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Shannon Smith, a “fire boss mine examiner” and EMT,3 to 
come to the scene, saying there was “a man crushed[.]”  (App. 
at 209, 211.)  Additionally, McDonald and Smith yelled for the 
“haulage” to be cleared out of the way – as is common in an 
emergency – to allow Consol to quickly get Stern out of the 
mine.4  (App. at 237, 250.) 
 
Smith reached the scene eight to ten minutes after 
receiving the call.  He noticed that Stern’s knee had an 
unnatural bend to it, indicating it was broken, and that Stern 
could not feel or move that leg.  Stern said he was in pain.  
Smith placed Stern in a neck brace, in case Stern had a spinal 
injury.   
 
Not all of Stern’s symptoms gave cause for concern.  
For example, Smith told the shift foreman that Stern “was 
calm, collected, good, no high pulse beat or anything like that.”  
(App. at 267.)  And Stern never lost consciousness or the 
ability to respond to questions coherently, nor did he have any 
problem with his pulse or breathing.     
 
                                              
3 A fire boss mine examiner “examine[s] the whole 
mine with the provisions of the law” for issues such as safety 
violations.  (App. at 209.)  EMTs are emergency medical 
technicians, sometimes called paramedics.  Smith was a 
licensed EMT, and McDonald had EMT training but was not 
licensed.   
 
4 “Clearing the haulage” means to “clear[] the 
equipment out of the way” within the mine to quicken 
extraction from the mine.  (App. at 134.) 
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Nevertheless, Smith viewed Stern’s injury as “[p]retty 
bad” and “traumatic,” and he later described it as “[t]he worst 
of the accidents” he had treated – which otherwise mainly 
consisted of “[b]umps and bruises[.]”  (App. at 220-21.)  And, 
in fact, some of Stern’s symptoms were alarming.  Perhaps 
most significantly, McDonald and Smith noticed that Stern’s 
stomach was becoming hard and distended.  They both 
recognized that as a sign of internal bleeding.5  Stern’s own 
fears were plain when he told Smith “[s]omething [along] the 
lines that if something did happen to [him], please tell [his] 
wife and family that [he] love[s] them[.]”  (App. at 220.) 
 
McDonald and Smith called the bunker to request “Life 
Flight,” a helicopter medevac service.  Smith “wanted to err on 
the side of caution” because he thought internal bleeding was 
possible, which he acknowledged can lead to death, and he 
feared “the possibility of – the uncontrollable.”  (App. at 226, 
236.)  McDonald likewise explained that when they felt Stern’s 
stomach, which was swelling, they got nervous and called Life 
Flight as a precaution; he said that stomach swelling can mean 
internal bleeding, which he testified has a reasonable potential 
to cause death.  Smith had never called Life Flight or heard of 
anyone doing so since he started working at the mine in 
2009 – years before Stern’s 2013 injury – and McDonald had 
never called Life Flight, although he knew of times it had been 
called.  Despite all that, McDonald testified that he did not 
believe there was a reasonable potential that Stern could die.   
 
                                              
5 Smith and McDonald were aware, however, that there 
are different degrees of internal bleeding and that hardening 
and swelling of the abdomen can be caused by things other than 
internal bleeding.   
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An attendant in the bunker called the mine safety 
supervisor, Michael Tennant, at home at about 3:30 or 3:45 
a.m.  The attendant told Tennant that there was an injured 
worker who had been “pinched between two [pieces of 
equipment] and EMTs were on their way.”  (App. at 279.)  
Tennant decided to go to the mine, even though he did not do 
so for every accident.  He went this time “[b]ecause an 
employee was pinched between two large pieces of 
equipment.”  (App. at 289.)  On his way, the attendant called 
again.  The attendant gave more information about the medical 
personnel and Stern’s extraction from the mine, and he said 
that Life Flight had been called6 and that Stern “had a broken 
leg, [a] dislocated indicated hip or some lower-type pelvis-type 
incident,” and “tightening of the stomach[,]” but “was 
conscious and alert, [and] had been talking.”  (App. at 280, 
330.)   
 
After Tennant arrived, at around 4:30 or 4:45 a.m., he 
spoke to Smith and others.  He called MSHA at approximately 
5:09 a.m.  Tennant testified, however, that he did not think 
there was a reasonable potential for death.  Rather, he reported 
the incident “because [inspectors] were going to be rolling in 
at any point in time, and [he] didn’t want them to come in and 
not know anything about the event[,]” given that “Life Flight 
was called” and there had been “a serious accident[.]”  (App. 
                                              
6 There is some ambiguity as to whether Tennant 
learned about the call to Life Flight during the first or second 
conversation with the bunker attendant.   
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at 318.)  He also said that Life Flight is often called even if 
injuries are not severe enough to notify MSHA.7   
 
Stern was ultimately taken to a hospital by ground 
because it was too foggy for a Life Flight airlift.  He did have 
internal bleeding, but doctors predicted it would stop within an 
hour and a half, and it did.  Surgery was performed because 
Stern had a broken pelvis.   
 
MSHA inspector Thomas Bochna investigated the 
incident.  He ultimately decided to issue Consol a citation 
under 30 C.F.R. § 50.10(b) for failing to alert MSHA about the 
accident within the first 15 minutes after it occurred.  He 
testified that he issued the citation based on the following 
reasoning: 
 
[A]fter interviews, investigating the accident, the 
conditions that the people onsite were observing, 
I thought in the first 15 minutes there was enough 
evidence with the things they were reporting that 
the person was complaining about, what he was 
feeling, what they were seeing, that it was 
reasonably – you know, an injury was 
– reasonable potential to cause death[.] 
 
 (App. At 157.)  He proposed a fine of $5,000, which was then 
the minimum under the statute and MSH regulations.   
 
                                              
7 In testimony, however, both Tennant and McDonald 
acknowledged that “red zone” incidents – where a miner enters 
a pinch point between pieces of equipment – are quite serious.   
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C. Procedural History 
The citation was litigated before an administrative law 
judge (“ALJ”) who upheld MSHA’s citation and the proposed 
penalty.  Consol promptly appealed to the Commission itself.   
 
The Commission affirmed.  It first determined the 
appropriate legal standard.  It observed that, “when assessing 
the merits of a violation under section 50.10(b), the 
Commission employs a reasonable person standard, resolving 
reasonable doubt in favor of notification[,]” and it concluded 
that “[t]he outcome determinative inquiry in this case is 
whether responsible Consol employees had information that 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude there was a 
reasonable potential for death based upon the nature of the 
injury and the totality of the circumstances.” (App. At 8, 10).  
It further said that, under the “totality of the circumstances” 
test, “the scope of the relevant evidence available to assist for 
purposes of section 50.10(b) generally will consist of the 
evidence available at the scene of the accident, at the time of 
the accident, and immediately following the accident[,]” and, 
“[w]hile the record will often contain subsequent relevant 
information from medical professionals, this information” is 
less probative because it “will likely not materialize until the 
time to make a decision to notify MSHA has already passed.”  
(App. At 8.)  The Commission made clear that “[t]he 
notification requirement does not, and cannot, rest upon a post-
medical treatment analysis of the likelihood of death from the 
injuries.”  (App. At 9.) 
 
Turning to a review of the facts, the Commission agreed 
with the ALJ that Consol was aware of information that would 
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lead a reasonable person to conclude that Stern’s injuries 
involved a reasonable potential for death.  It said: 
 
In light of the knowledge and training possessed 
by Tennant, McDonald, and Smith, we conclude 
that someone with sufficient authority at Consol 
was aware of Stern’s injury-causing event.  
These employees surely realized from their 
training that, when a miner is pinched between 
major pieces of equipment and then suffers from 
a distended and hardened abdomen, there is a 
high potential if not a likelihood of internal 
bleeding.  In turn, nearly every knowledgeable 
witness testified to the obvious – namely, 
internal bleeding is a potential cause of death.  
Under these circumstances, the evidence 
overwhelmingly demonstrates that a reasonable 
person possessing the available information 
would have concluded there was a reasonable 
potential for death. 
 
(App. at 11; see also App. at 10 (“Perhaps most importantly 
and certainly outcome determinative here, … [Smith and 
McDonald] became aware of possible internal bleeding, knew 
such bleeding could cause death, and asked for a Life Flight 
due to concern over the nature and severity of Stern’s injuries, 
including the circumstances which caused them.”).)  The 
Commission concluded that substantial evidence supported the 
ALJ’s “finding that Consol had a duty to contact MSHA 
immediately after the accident.”  (App. at 3.) 
 
 Next, the Commission considered the appropriate 
penalty.  It rejected Consol’s argument that the ALJ “erred in 
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failing to consider a penalty lower than the statutory minimum 
of $5,000 because the Commission assesses penalties de novo 
and is not bound by” the penalty provisions in 30 U.S.C. 
§ 820(a)(2).  (App. at 13.)  The Commission explained that it 
“ha[d] determined that an assessment of penalty for a non-
flagrant violation of section 50.10(b) is governed by” the 
limitations in § 820(a)(2).  (App. at 13.)  And, it reasoned that 
§ 820(a)(4) requires courts to “apply at least the minimum 
penalties required under” § 820(a), so “[a] statutory scheme [of 
the sort Consol suggested] that permits the Commission to 
assess any penalty, however minimal, but requires a reviewing 
court to impose a penalty of at least $5,000, makes no sense.”  
(App. at 14 (citation omitted).) 
 
 Consol timely petitioned for review.   
 
II. DISCUSSION8 
 
Consol raises three primary challenges to the 
Commission’s decision.  First, it says the legal standard applied 
by the Commission is inappropriate.  Second, it asserts that the 
citation is not supported by substantial evidence.  And third, it 
contends that the Commission was not bound by the mandatory 
minimum penalty of $5,000.  Each of those positions is 
unpersuasive. 
 
                                              
8 The Commission had jurisdiction pursuant to 30 
U.S.C. §§ 815(d), 823(d).  We have jurisdiction under 30 
U.S.C. § 816(a)(1).  We review legal conclusions de novo and 
findings of fact for substantial evidence.  Cumberland Coal 
Res., LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 515 
F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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A. The Commission’s Legal Standard 
Consol attacks various aspects of the legal standard 
articulated by the Commission.  But that standard is correct 
and, indeed, compelled by the pertinent statute and regulation, 
30 U.S.C. § 813(j) and 30 C.F.R. § 50.10(b). 
 
i. The Commission’s Legal Standard Is 
Required by 30 U.S.C. § 813(j) and 30 
C.F.R. § 50.10(b) 
The Commission’s legal standard, in summary, is as 
follows.  First, reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of 
notifying MSHA; second, liability must be assessed based on 
whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would view 
the injuries as having a reasonable potential to cause death; 
third, the totality of the circumstances must be considered; and 
fourth, the focus must be on the information available around 
the time of the injury, so post-hoc medical evidence is less 
probative. 
 
We have never had occasion to interpret 30 U.S.C. 
§ 813(j) or 30 C.F.R. § 50.10(b), so we start from first 
principles of statutory and regulatory construction.9  Cf. Pa. 
                                              
9 Consol does not argue that the regulation conflicts 
with the statute.  Accordingly, we need not consider whether 
the regulation is an appropriate construction of the statute and 
we treat both provisions in tandem.  We note, however, that 
there seems to be a gap between the statute and the regulation.  
Section 813(j) says that an operator must notify MSHA “within 
15 minutes of the time at which the operator realizes that … an 
injury … of an individual at the mine which has a reasonable 
potential to cause death, has occurred[,]” 30 U.S.C. § 813(j) 
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Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 337, 
351 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The basic tenets of statutory construction 
apply to construction of regulations[.]”).  Our Pole Star is the 
principle that, if a statute or rule is unambiguous, we must give 
effect to its plain meaning.  See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 
2400, 2415 (2019) (stating the principle in the context of 
regulatory interpretation).  We are further guided by the 
Supreme Court’s recent admonition that “hard interpretive 
conundrums, even relating to complex rules, can often be 
solved” without “wav[ing] the ambiguity flag[.]”  Id.  Indeed, 
we may not consider a statute or rule to be “genuinely 
ambiguous” unless it remains unclear after we have 
“exhaust[ed] all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.”  Id. 
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).  Consequently, our analysis 
proceeds by “‘carefully consider[ing]’ the text, structure, 
history, and purpose” of the statute and regulation.  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 
We start with the language of the notification 
requirement itself.  See Food Mktg. Inst. V. Argus Leader 
Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (“In statutory 
                                              
(emphasis added), whereas the regulation contains a similar 
directive but uses the term “knows or should know” instead of 
“realizes,” 30 C.F.R. § 50.10.  But, even if we were to consider 
that gap, it would not affect our analysis here.  The 
Commission’s decision was premised on its conclusion that 
Consol “knew the requisite information” and that “a reasonable 
person evaluating the known facts would have found a 
reasonable potential for death.”  (App. at 11 n.10 (emphasis 
added).)  Those factual premises are sound, and we take the 
same approach. 
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interpretation disputes, a court’s proper starting point lies in a 
careful examination of the ordinary meaning and structure of 
the law itself.”).  As referenced earlier, § 813(j) provides, in 
relevant part: 
 
In the event of any accident occurring in any coal 
or other mine, the operator shall notify 
[MSHA]10 thereof and shall take appropriate 
measures to prevent the destruction of any 
evidence which would assist in investigating the 
cause or causes thereof.  For purposes of the 
preceding sentence, the notification required 
shall be provided by the operator within 15 
minutes of the time at which the operator realizes 
that the death of an individual at the mine, or an 
injury or entrapment of an individual at the mine 
which has a reasonable potential to cause death, 
has occurred. 
 
30 U.S.C. § 813(j).  Similarly, the regulation says, in part: 
 
The operator shall immediately contact MSHA 
at once without delay and within 15 minutes at 
the toll-free number, 1–800–746–1553, once the 
operator knows or should know that an accident 
has occurred involving: … (b) An injury of an 
individual at the mine which has a reasonable 
potential to cause death[.] 
 
                                              
10 Again, MSHA is the delegate of the Secretary of 
Labor. 
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30 C.F.R. § 50.10.  On its face, that language does not specify 
the standard by which one is to determine whether an injury 
from a mine accident is one “which has a reasonable potential 
to cause death.”  Thus, we look to other sources of guidance. 
 
 The first source we consider is the stated purpose of the 
Mine Act.  The “Congressional findings and declaration of 
purpose[,]” set forth in 30 U.S.C. § 801, specify that the goal 
of the Mine Act is to protect miners.  Section 801 says, for 
example, that “the first priority and concern of all in the coal 
or other mining industry must be the health and safety of its 
most precious resource – the miner”; that “deaths and serious 
injuries from unsafe and unhealthful conditions and practices 
in the coal or other mines cause grief and suffering to the 
miners and to their families”; and that “there is an urgent need 
to provide more effective means and measures for improving 
the working conditions and practices in the Nation’s coal or 
other mines in order to prevent death and serious physical 
harm[.]”  30 U.S.C. § 801(a)-(c); see also Thunder Basin Coal 
Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 202 (1994) (“Congress adopted the 
Mine Act ‘to protect the health and safety of the Nation’s coal 
or other miners.’” (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 801(g)).  Moreover, 
§ 801 makes clear that miner protection is central to the mining 
industry’s interests, so the Mine Act does not seek to balance 
miners’ safety against any inconvenience associated with 
compliance that mine operators might face.  See 30 U.S.C. 
§ 801(d) (“[T]he existence of unsafe and unhealthful 
conditions and practices in the Nation’s coal or other mines is 
a serious impediment to the future growth of the coal or other 
mining industry and cannot be tolerated[.]”); see also id. 
§ 801(f) (“[T]he disruption of production and the loss of 
income to operators and miners as a result of coal or other mine 
accidents … unduly impedes and burdens commerce[.]”). 
17 
 
 
The second source of guidance we look to is the 
objectives of the notification requirement itself.  That 
requirement is plainly designed to encourage rapid notification 
so that MSHA can respond effectively in an emergency and 
preserve evidence to facilitate later investigation.  Section 
813(j) specifies that “any accident occurring in any coal or 
other mine” is to be reported to MSHA.  Id. § 813(j).  So it is 
not just potentially deadly accidents that are reportable.11  
Furthermore, § 813(j) says that mine operators must “take 
appropriate measures to prevent the destruction of any 
evidence which would assist in investigating the cause or 
causes” of an accident and, “where rescue and recovery work 
is necessary, [MSHA] shall take whatever action [it] deems 
appropriate to protect the life of any person, and [it] may, if [it] 
deems it appropriate, supervise and direct the rescue and 
recovery activities[.]”  Id.  Thus, concern for the preservation 
“of any evidence which would assist in investigating the cause 
or causes” of accidents, and, more importantly, the need for 
government action “to protect the life of any person” and 
manage “rescue and recovery activities[,]” id., justify reporting 
of non-lethal accidents too.  The 15-minute notification 
window is in force for potentially deadly accidents, and reflects 
the naturally heightened level of concern. When death is a 
reasonable possibility, “[i]mmediate notification activates 
MSHA emergency response efforts, which can be critical in 
saving lives, stabilizing the situation, and preserving the 
                                              
11 Under the Mine Act, “accident” is defined to include 
“a mine explosion, mine ignition, mine fire, or mine 
inundation, or injury to, or death of, any person[.]”  30 U.S.C. 
§ 802(k). 
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accident scene[,]” and “[p]rompt notification enables MSHA 
to secure an accident site, preserving vital evidence that can 
otherwise be easily lost.”12  Emergency Mine Evacuation, 71 
Fed. Reg. at 71,431, 71,435. 
 
The final source of guidance is the history of the 
notification requirement.  Relevant here, the 15-minute rule 
was added to the statutory framework by the MINER Act, 
which was enacted largely in response to three lethal mining 
accidents.  S. Rep. No. 109-365, at 1-2, 9; see also Cumberland 
Coal, 717 F.3d at 1022 (“The violations at issue in this case 
arose under amendments to the [Mine] Act enacted in response 
to three multiple-fatality mine disasters, in which miners who 
were unable to evacuate mines died.”).  The MINER Act 
Senate Report explained that “[t]hese tragedies serve as a 
somber reminder that even that which has been done well can 
always be done better.”  S. Rep. No. 109-365, at 2.  The 
MINER Act codified an MSHA emergency regulation that first 
imposed the 15-minute notification rule.  See Emergency Mine 
Evacuation, 71 Fed. Reg. 12,252 (Mar. 9, 2006). 
 
That earlier MSHA emergency regulation was 
promulgated in response to two of the same incidents that 
                                              
12 Under the regulation, the 15-minute notification 
requirement attaches to all “accident[s,]” 30 C.F.R. § 50.10, 
and the regulatory definition of “[a]ccident” includes 12 
specific types of events, including “[a]n injury to an individual 
at a mine which has a reasonable potential to cause death[,]” 
id. § 50.2(h) (emphasis added).  The statute and regulation thus 
agree that potentially deadly accidents require notification 
within 15 minutes.  Cf. id. § 50.10(a)-(c) (requiring notification 
within 15 minutes for deadly or potentially deadly accidents). 
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motivated the MINER Act.  Id. at 12,252, 12,253-54; see also 
Cumberland Coal, 717 F.3d at 1022 (“Also in the wake of the 
disasters, MSHA issued an Emergency Temporary Standard on 
emergency mine evacuations in March 2006.”).  The 
emergency rulemaking explained that, “[i]n response to the 
recent accidents …, MSHA has determined that new accident 
notification, safety and training standards are necessary to 
further protect miners when a mine accident takes place.”  
Emergency Mine Evacuation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 12,253.  The 
very first of the “new standards” described was the 15-minute 
rule, and MSHA emphasized that the rule would serve to better 
protect miners by facilitating the objectives of the notification 
requirement, as set out above.  See id. (“Such immediate 
notification will enable help to arrive sooner at the mine, and 
protect miners from the grave dangers of physical injury and 
death.”); id. at 12,257 (“Notification alerts the Agency so that 
accident investigations and assistance to trapped or injured 
miners can be initiated.”).  In sum, the history of the 
notification requirement shows that a 15-minute provision was 
adopted in response to deadly mine accidents and was meant 
to increase the speed of notification to allow MSHA to more 
effectively protect miners. 
 
Considering those several guideposts together, it is 
plain that the notification requirement was designed to serve 
the Mine Act’s unyielding purpose of protecting miners by 
encouraging rapid notification, thereby allowing MSHA to 
effectively initiate an emergency response and to ensure the 
preservation of evidence for use in investigations.  The 
notification requirement should be interpreted to effectuate that 
purpose.  In light of that, the Commission’s legal standard is 
entirely sound, as a consideration of each of the four 
components of that legal standard demonstrates. 
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1. Reasonable Doubts Must Be 
Resolved in Favor of 
Notification 
First, it makes sense that all reasonable doubts must be 
resolved in favor of notifying MSHA.  If the rule were 
otherwise, mine operators would be encouraged not to call 
MSHA until an accident was sure to be life threatening,13 
despite the standard being an accident having “a reasonable 
potential to cause death.”  The severity and scope of an 
emergency are rarely apparent in the moment, and by the time 
clarity has been achieved, an MSHA response may be too little, 
too late.  Furthermore, no risk to miners would result from an 
erroneous MSHA notification, whereas substantial risk could 
result from a failure to notify, with MSHA being prevented 
from initiating an emergency response and beginning a 
successful investigation.  Given that the notification 
                                              
13 The Commission said that it “has not found it 
necessary to” define “reasonable potential to cause death.”  
(App. at 7 (citing Secretary of Labor v. Signal Peak Energy, 
LLC, 37 FMSHRC 470, 474 (2015)).)  In Signal Peak, the 
Commission observed that it was enough to say the accident 
was “life-threatening[,]” because, in that case, the miner’s 
“injuries clearly [fell] within the realm of a reasonable 
potential to cause death[.]”  37 FMSHRC at 474 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, the Commission 
both here and in Signal Peak concluded that the injuries at issue 
had a reasonable potential to cause death under a “life 
threatening” standard.  We follow the Commission’s lead in 
that regard and use “life threatening” as a working 
interpretation of “reasonable potential to cause death.” 
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requirement and the statutory and regulatory scheme at issue 
are designed to provide robust protections for miners – and not 
to balance those protections against compliance 
difficulties – the only rule that effectuates the purpose of the 
statute and regulation is one that requires notification in cases 
where there is reasonable doubt whether the accident will 
prove to have “a reasonable potential to cause death.” 
 
Consol argues that requiring reasonable doubts to be 
resolved in favor of notification appears nowhere in the text of 
the statue or regulation and that adopting such a rule shifts the 
burden of proof to the operator.  But that argument misses the 
mark, because a logical reading of the text does support the 
rule, as we have just explained, and, in any event, text is the 
starting point in understanding a statute or regulation, not 
necessarily the ending point.  Moreover, the conclusion that 
reasonably doubtful cases require notification has nothing to 
do with who must prove whether a case falls into the 
“reasonably doubtful” category. 
 
2. The Notification Requirement 
Must Be Interpreted from the 
Perspective of a Reasonable 
Person in the Circumstances 
Second, the notification requirement must be analyzed 
on an objective basis, asking whether a reasonable person in 
the circumstances would view a miner’s injury as having a 
reasonable potential to cause death.  Only an objective test 
ensures that mine operators cannot weaken miner protection by 
asserting their subjective views as a defense against calling 
MSHA.  An objective standard – which focuses on the 
reasonably perceived severity of an accident in the 
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moment – likewise reinforces the incentive for mine operators 
to notify MSHA quickly, when the agency can take effective 
action. 
 
To its credit, Consol does not claim that a subjective 
standard would suffice.  Rather, the alternative rule it argues 
for would require MSHA to prove that the injured miner 
actually faced a reasonable potential for death as a matter of 
medical fact, even if the actual severity of his injuries was 
unknowable at the time of the incident.  That rule, however, 
like a subjective standard, would undermine what the 
notification requirement seeks to accomplish.  In marginal 
cases, it would encourage mine operators to forego calling 
MSHA after an accident in the hopes that the true but presently 
unknown medical facts would turn out to be better than those 
perceived in the moment.  Under Consol’s proposal, an injury 
would not become reportable until a mine operator has gained 
sufficient expert advice to say with medical certainty that the 
injury had a reasonable potential to cause death.  That, of 
course, would mean almost certain delay, since physicians are 
not on standby in mines.14  Consol’s rule would thus frustrate 
rather than facilitate reporting.  See Sec’y of Labor v. Cougar 
                                              
14 Consol asserts that delay would not be a problem, 
contending that “[t]he immediacy burden on Consol has 
nothing to do with the elemental burden on the Secretary.”  
(Opening Br. at 27.)  But we fail to see how that could be so.  
If MSHA can only prove whether an injury having a reasonable 
potential to cause death occurred by resorting to medical 
evidence, it follows that a mine operator could not have 
sufficient awareness of the occurrence of such an injury until 
the medical evidence is available, and it is highly unlikely to 
be available on site. 
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Coal Co., 25 FMSHRC 513, 521 (2003) (“If we were to accept 
the [ALJ’s] construction [requiring that MSHA furnish a 
medical opinion that a miner’s injuries had a reasonable 
potential to cause death], a medical or clinical opinion of the 
potential of death would be needed before an accident is even 
determined to be reportable under section 50.10.  Such a 
construction would serve to frustrate the immediate reporting 
of near fatal accidents.”). 
 
The conclusion that a “reasonable person in the 
circumstances” standard is the required one – and that a rule 
focused on the eventually proven medical severity of an injury 
is not – is further supported by our determination that 
reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of notification.  
When the perceived severity of an injury is high but the true 
medical severity is not yet known, a mine operator should 
surely have a reasonable doubt about concluding that no 
reasonable potential for death exists. 
 
Finally, in Mainline Rock & Ballast, Inc. v. Secretary of 
Labor, 693 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2012), one of the few Court 
of Appeals opinions on point, the Tenth Circuit upheld a 
citation under 30 C.F.R. § 50.10(b) by applying a “reasonable 
person in the circumstances” test, and it did so without ever 
addressing whether MSHA had proven that the injury involved 
a reasonable potential for death as a matter of medical fact.  
Mainline Rock, 693 F.3d at 1189.  Further, and importantly, the 
court nowhere described that regulation as ambiguous, but 
24 
 
rather treated the standard it applied as the one obviously and 
logically required.15 
 
Although the foregoing analysis adequately 
demonstrates that the statute and regulation are governed by a 
“reasonable person in the circumstances” standard, that 
conclusion is reinforced by the history of the regulation.  The 
post-MINER Act rulemaking expressly said that the 
notification inquiry “is based on what a reasonable person 
would discern under the circumstances, particularly when 
‘[t]he decision to call MSHA must be made in a matter of 
minutes after a serious accident.’”  Emergency Mine 
Evacuation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 71,434 (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).  And it rejected a focus on 
the medical facts, stating, “the operator’s decision as to what 
constitutes a ‘reasonable potential to cause death’ ‘cannot be 
made upon the basis of clinical or hypertechnical opinions as 
to a miner’s chance of survival.’”  Id. at 71,433-34 (citation 
omitted). 
 
In short, the standard that best accomplishes the aims of 
the notification requirement is one that focuses on whether a 
reasonable mine operator in the circumstances would perceive 
a reasonable potential for death.  Consol challenges that 
conclusion by asserting that, under a “reasonable person in the 
circumstances” standard, “the operator would face an ever-
moving target and have no way to defend itself[.]”  (Opening 
Br. at 26.)  Not so.  The target is clear, even if it is not the one 
Consol would prefer to have in its sights.  Giving Consol what 
                                              
15 Because the operative language of the statute and 
regulation are the same, we view Mainline Rock as supporting 
our interpretation of both. 
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it wants – a complete defense based on medical facts unknown 
at the time – would, as set out above, substantially conflict with 
the statutory and regulatory framework before us.16 
 
3. The Totality of the 
Circumstances Must Be 
Considered 
It is also clear that § 813(j) and its regulatory 
counterpart, § 50.10(b), must be applied in light of the “totality 
of the circumstances.”  Under a “reasonable person in the 
circumstances” standard, the circumstances to be considered 
are necessarily all of them, not just some.  How else could one 
be expected to assess whether an injury suggests a reasonable 
potential for death, other than by using a “totality of the 
circumstances” test?  Injuries, by the very nature of the 
accidents that cause them and the complexity of the human 
body, come in too many varieties to easily catalogue.  And the 
factors suggesting that an injury is serious are just as diverse.  
A “totality” inquiry is thus proper because, as with other 
matters of judgment, whether an injury is reasonably perceived 
as life threatening is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to 
a neat set of legal rules.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 
238 (1983) (concluding that a “totality of the circumstances” 
test was appropriate in a Fourth Amendment case); see also 
                                              
16 Consol also argues that, “[h]istorically, ALJs actually 
required the Secretary to present medical proof to sustain a 
violation[.]”  (Opening Br. at 23.)  That argument, however, 
gains no traction because, even if the historical assertion is 
accurate, the statute and regulation are unambiguous, and ALJ 
decisions neither bind the Commission nor qualify as agency 
precedent.  29 C.F.R. § 2700.69(d); Big Ridge, 715 F.3d at 640. 
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Mainline Rock, 693 F.3d at 1189 (upholding a citation under 
30 C.F.R. § 50.10(b) after holistically analyzing a mining 
accident and concluding that “the obvious circumstances of the 
accident would have triggered some minimal degree of inquiry 
in a reasonable person, thus prompting a call to the MSHA”).   
 
Again, the purpose of the notification requirement has 
to be borne in mind.  Myopically focusing on one factor or a 
subset of factors, rather than the totality of the 
circumstances, would permit mine operators to avoid calling 
MSHA, even while possessing information reasonably 
showing that an injury is life threatening, simply because that 
information did not fit into an artificially-constructed category.  
Any test other than one based on a “totality of the 
circumstances” would thus put miners at unnecessary risk and 
would undermine the purposes and design of the notification 
requirement. 
 
The necessity of a “totality” approach is underscored by 
the above-noted conclusion that all reasonable doubts must be 
resolved in favor of notification.  A holistic approach captures 
the full range of information that could lead to reasonable 
doubts about concluding that no reasonable potential for death 
exists. 
 
The history of the regulation remains instructive.  The 
notification decision was expressly contemplated as being 
“based on what a reasonable person would discern under the 
circumstances[.]”  Emergency Mine Evacuation, 71 Fed. Reg. 
at 71,434 (emphasis added).  And, the drafters of the regulation 
explained that injuries involving a reasonable potential for 
death “can result from various indicative events,” so they 
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encouraged that all factors, including the injury itself and the 
nature of the accident, be considered.17  Id. 
 
Consol mainly challenges the “totality of the 
circumstances” rule on the ground that it permits factors not 
listed in the statute or regulation to overcome a lack of medical 
evidence.  In that regard, it contends that the focus must be on 
the injury alone and not the circumstances surrounding it 
                                              
17 We note that “totality of the circumstances” can be 
read in two different, albeit related, ways.  First, it can refer to 
what the mine operator must consider in deciding whether to 
call MSHA.  Second, it can refer to the evidence courts and the 
Commission should consider in evaluating a notification 
charge.  In our view, both readings are appropriate and 
required.  That is so for the first reading for all the reasons set 
out above.  And it is so for the second reading because that 
reading is simply the adjudicatory corollary of the first.   
The second reading is broader than the first, as it allows 
consideration of evidence that was not actually before the mine 
operator at the time the operator made the decision whether to 
notify MSHA.  But considering all available evidence is 
appropriate at the adjudication stage because it can provide 
important circumstantial evidence of what a reasonable mine 
operator would have perceived.  For example, if there were 
little direct evidence of what a mine operator actually saw 
around the time of an accident, but the record demonstrated 
that numerous mine employees were nearby when the accident 
occurred and that a post-hoc medical examination revealed that 
the injured miner had been bleeding profusely since the 
moment of injury, the post-hoc medical evidence could be 
viewed as significant circumstantial evidence of what was 
known at the scene. 
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– such as the nature of the accident – because “injury” is what 
appears in the text.  It further asserts that “[r]ushing to get 
someone to the hospital fast is not proof that someone may die” 
and neither “is the nature of the accident (e.g., a car being 
totaled sounds terrible, but people walk away from such 
accidents).”  (Reply Br. at 16 n.9.)  And, more generally, it 
warns that, “[i]f the Court allows uninterpreted generalized 
observations to act as a substitute for evidence, then all the 
Secretary will have to do is call one witness to describe a 
chaotic injury scene and the ALJ, who also has no medical 
training, would then be free to speculate that virtually any 
injury has a reasonable potential to cause death.”  (Reply Br. at 
17.)   
 
Those arguments conveniently neglect that generalized 
observations are evidence, often crucial evidence, and nothing 
in the statute or regulation requires or even encourages that 
they be ignored.  Consol’s suggestion that a “totality” standard 
is inappropriate because it allows consideration of factors that 
are not listed in the statute or regulation rests on the blinkered 
notion that only that which is express and nothing that is 
plainly implied is the meaning of a text.  Ordinary experience 
and general legal principles prove that wrong.  Cf. Gates, 462 
U.S. at 232, 238 (adopting a “totality of the circumstances” test 
in the probable cause context even though the Fourth 
Amendment does not mention “totality of the circumstances” 
or describe what those circumstances might include). 
 
Furthermore, Consol’s argument that a “totality” 
inquiry can wrongly be used to “overcome” a lack of medical 
evidence could only be true if the notification requirement 
focused on whether the injured miner faced a reasonable 
potential for death as a matter of medical fact.  But that is not 
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the case, for reasons already discussed.  Later-developed 
medical evidence is not the focus.  And, we cannot accept the 
contention that the notification requirement forbids 
consideration of the circumstances surrounding an injury, such 
as the nature of the accident that caused it. 
 
Relatedly, Consol’s assertion that some factors 
considered under a “totality” inquiry might not prove a 
reasonable potential for death is beside the point.  Yes, an 
individual fact taken in isolation may not prove something, but 
that does not make the fact irrelevant.  The very reason to have 
a “totality” inquiry is so that all facts can be considered 
together and analyzed holistically.  In that regard, the fear that 
a mere description of a chaotic scene will lead to liability is 
unfounded.  Under a test that examines all available evidence, 
a description of a chaotic scene, without more, is unlikely to 
establish that an injury involving a reasonable potential for 
death had occurred.  It is the “more,” not the chaotic scene, that 
Consol needs to be chiefly worried about. 
 
Lastly, Consol’s position is unconvincing in light of 
what both the post-MINER Act rulemaking and Mainline Rock 
persuasively instruct.  The rulemaking explained that certain 
injuries involving a reasonable potential for death “can result 
from various indicative events,” demonstrating that the nature 
of the accident is a relevant consideration.  Emergency Mine 
Evacuation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 71,434.  And, in Mainline Rock, 
the court made clear that the nature of the accident is relevant 
and, indeed, could be dispositive.  See 693 F.3d at 1189 (“Th[e] 
knowledge [that a miner had been pulled through a roller] alone 
would have alerted [a mining official] to the severity of the 
accident and the potential for death.”). 
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4. The Focus of the Notification 
Requirement Must Be on the 
Information Available at the 
Time of Injury, So Post-Hoc 
Medical Evidence Is Less 
Probative  
 Finally, because the focus of the notification 
requirement must be on the information available to the mine 
operator around the time of the injury, post-hoc medical 
evidence is less probative of whether MSHA should be 
notified.  If reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of 
notification, evidence that was not available at the time of the 
injury, such as post-hoc medical evidence, will not resolve 
reasonable doubts created in the moment by an injury that is 
apparently life threatening.  The focus must be on the facts 
available at the time of injury, and post-hoc medical evidence 
can, at best, serve in the attenuated role of raising an inference 
about what the mine operator perceived, including the injury’s 
apparent severity.  If the totality of the circumstances around 
the time of the accident is considered – as it must be – the 
importance of post-hoc evidence will necessarily be diluted.18 
 
                                              
18 Consol counters that, “[u]ntil now, hospital-based 
information has been routinely relied upon by the Commission 
in other cases.”  (Reply Br. at 12.)  But neither of the decisions 
Consol cites actually relied on such evidence.  See Signal Peak, 
37 FMSHRC at 473, 476-77; Cougar Coal, 25 FMSHRC at 
521.  More to the point, however, nothing in the Commission’s 
ruling or in ours today prevents reliance on hospital-based 
information, when that information is kept in proper 
perspective. 
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ii. Consol’s Additional Challenges to the 
Commission’s Legal Standard Are 
Unavailing 
Consol raises two additional arguments challenging the 
Commission’s legal standard and its application here.  Neither 
convinces us that the Commission erred. 
 
1. Reasonable Person Comparator 
 Evidence  
Consol first argues that, if we adopt a “reasonable 
person in the circumstances” standard, MSHA should have to 
present comparator evidence to prove what a reasonable person 
would have done.  It says that, in Secretary of Labor v. Leeco, 
Inc., No. KENT 2012-166, 2016 WL 4158378 (F.M.S.H.R.C. 
July 18, 2016), the Commission required such proof.     
 
That argument overreads Leeco.  In that case, the 
Commission simply said that, when MSHA seeks to prove that 
a mining company acted negligently, it cannot satisfy its 
burden by saying the company “should have done more” and, 
instead, must “show[] what additional steps” the company 
should have taken to meet its standard of care.  Id. at *4-5.  That 
observation is inapposite to notification cases, in which there 
is no need to determine what “additional steps” might have 
been required.  The core question in cases like this is whether 
a reasonable mine operator would have called MSHA, and that 
question is answerable through evidence of the facts available 
around the time of the accident.  Indeed, that has been the 
Commission’s approach, Secretary of Labor v. Signal Peak 
Energy, LLC, 37 FMSHRC 470, 475-77 (2015), and the Tenth 
Circuit followed it as well in Mainline Rock, 693 F.3d at 1189. 
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Furthermore, whether someone acted reasonably is 
typically a question for the finder of fact, at least as long as 
“reasonableness” is within the factfinder’s common 
knowledge and experience.  See, e.g., Natale v. Camden Cty. 
Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 580 (3d Cir. 2003) (“A 
reasonable jury could conclude that [Prison Health Service] 
personnel were negligent absent expert testimony. …  While 
laypersons are unlikely to know how often insulin-dependent 
diabetics need insulin, common sense – the judgment imparted 
by human experience – would tell a layperson that medical 
personnel charged with caring for an insulin-dependent 
diabetic should determine how often the diabetic needs 
insulin.”); Wilburn v. Maritrans GP Inc., 139 F.3d 350, 360 
(3d Cir. 1998) (“The jury could have found [based on its 
common understanding] that Maritrans was liable for 
negligence  because the Samson line was not released in a 
manner that was reasonably prudent under the exigent 
circumstances confronting the persons aboard the 
Enterprise.”); cf. Vázquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 
504 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[A] typical tort claim involves 
the generic ‘reasonably prudent person’ standard of care (or 
duty) and requires the plaintiff to present no evidence about the 
defendant’s duty[.]”).  It is within the province of the 
Commission’s ALJs to determine whether a reasonable mine 
operator would have perceived a reasonable potential for death.  
Cf. Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 214 (explaining that claims 
arising under the Mine Act “fall squarely within the 
Commission’s expertise”). 
 
Nothing in the statute or regulation suggests an intent to 
create a novel evidentiary rule requiring “reasonable person” 
comparator evidence.  We presume that rulemaking authorities 
are aware of existing law when they promulgate statutes or 
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regulations. Cf. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics 
Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 169 (2014) (“[W]e presume that Congress 
is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)).  If Consol’s proposed 
evidentiary rule had been envisioned, it would surely have 
been made explicit in the statute and regulation. 
 
2. Fair Notice 
Second, Consol argues that it did not have fair notice of 
either the Commission’s “totality of the circumstances” test or 
its “reasonable person in the circumstances” standard.  Consol 
raises a number of arguments in that regard, but, based on a 
single line of reasoning, we conclude that all are without merit. 
 
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated 
for lack of fair notice if a statute or regulation “fails to provide 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is 
prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages 
seriously discriminatory enforcement.”  FTC v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation 
omitted).  That “fair notice doctrine extends to civil cases, 
particularly where a penalty is imposed.”  Id. at 250.  But, a 
party necessarily has fair notice of how a statute or regulation 
will be interpreted if only one interpretation is unambiguously 
compelled by the provision at issue.19  See Sec’y of Labor v. 
                                              
19 That is not to say that a party can never raise a fair 
notice challenge to unambiguous laws.  For example, a 
provision may plainly require a certain legal standard that itself 
does not provide fair notice of how it will be applied.  A fair 
notice challenge would be appropriate in that circumstance to 
contest the required standard. 
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Beverly Healthcare-Hillview, 541 F.3d 193, 197-98 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“Before we assess … whether Beverly had fair notice 
of that interpretation, we must determine whether the meaning 
of regulatory language is ‘free from doubt.’ …  If Beverly is 
correct [that the language is unambiguous], our inquiry would 
be at an end.” (citation omitted)).  Here, we have concluded 
that the Commission’s legal standard is plainly compelled by 
the statute and regulation.  Consol thus had fair notice of it. 
 
To the extent Consol’s argument is that the 
Commission’s legal standard fails to provide fair notice of how 
it will be applied and so Consol lacked fair notice that the 
specific factual scenario at issue here would constitute a 
notification violation, again its position is unpersuasive.  
Where, as here, an economic regulation is in question, fair 
notice is deemed given unless “the relevant standard is ‘so 
vague as to be no rule or standard at all[,]’” which is an 
“especially lax” requirement.20  Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 250 
(citation omitted).  The Commission’s legal standard is not so 
vague as to fall into that category,21 and, as suggested already 
                                              
20 Recall that whether 30 C.F.R. § 50.10 is a proper 
interpretation of 30 U.S.C. § 813(j) is not at issue here. 
 
21 Courts commonly conclude that MSHA complies 
with the fair notice requirement when it “take[s] action to 
correct violations that would be apparent to a reasonably 
prudent miner.” Consol Buchanan Mining Co. v. Sec’y of 
Labor, 841 F.3d 642, 649-50 (4th Cir. 2016).  Here, the 
Commission’s legal standard allows mine operators to be 
penalized only if a reasonable mine operator would have 
viewed a miner’s injuries as involving a reasonable potential 
for death. 
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and detailed further herein, we think it extraordinarily clear 
that the injuries in this case reflected a reasonable potential for 
death. 
 
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the 
 Commission’s Decision 
 
Consol also argues that substantial evidence does not 
support the citation against it.  That is a surprising argument, 
to say the least.  The factual finding at issue here is the ALJ’s 
determination – agreed to and affirmed by the 
Commission – that “responsible Consol employees had 
information that would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
there was a reasonable potential for death[.]”22  (App. at 10.)  
That finding is conclusive if it is supported by substantial 
                                              
 
22 That conclusion is essentially a finding of fact.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328B cmt. g (Am. Law Inst. 
1965) (noting that “[n]ormally the determination of the 
question whether the defendant has conformed to the standard 
of conduct required of him by the law is for the jury” and that 
“it is customarily regarded as a question of fact”); U.S. Gypsum 
Co. v. Schiavo Bros., 668 F.2d 172, 176 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(explaining that the issue of “how a reasonable person would 
have acted in a like situation” is “a determination that is 
peculiarly one for the factfinder”); cf. Cumberland Coal, 515 
F.3d at 259 (“The Commission correctly concluded that there 
was substantial evidence to support the January 16 citation, 
since ‘a reasonably prudent person would have recognized that 
the bleeder system failed to continuously dilute and move the 
methane-air mixture from the worked-out area away from the 
active workings.’” (citation omitted)).  
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evidence, “mean[ing] such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion.”  
Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 515 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation 
omitted). 
 
Like the Commission, “we conclude that someone with 
sufficient authority at Consol was aware of Stern’s injury-
causing event[,]” given “the knowledge and training possessed 
by Tennant, McDonald, and Smith,” and that “the evidence 
overwhelmingly demonstrates that a reasonable person 
possessing the available information would have concluded 
there was a reasonable potential for death.”23  (App. at 11.) 
 
To recapitulate some relevant facts, McDonald learned 
immediately after the accident that Stern had been crushed 
between multi-ton pieces of equipment, was in severe pain, 
could not move his legs, and could feel “the pinch” on one leg.  
McDonald called for Smith (an EMT), for an ambulance, and 
(along with Smith) for the mine haulage to be cleared so Stern 
could be evacuated.  McDonald knew the serious consequences 
of such an accident.  Smith viewed Stern’s injury as “[p]retty 
bad” and “traumatic[.]”  (App. at 220.)  Demonstrating concern 
that Stern might have a spinal injury, Smith placed him in a 
neck brace.   
 
On the way out of the mine, Smith and McDonald 
noticed that Stern’s stomach was becoming hard and distended, 
a sign, they knew, of internal bleeding.  Both recognized that 
                                              
23 Consol does not challenge that the knowledge of 
Tennant, McDonald, and Smith can be imputed to it for 
purposes of the notification analysis. 
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internal bleeding can lead to death.  And Smith and McDonald 
were sufficiently concerned about Stern’s stomach symptoms 
to request a Life Flight evacuation.  Neither Smith nor 
McDonald had ever called Life Flight before, and Smith had 
not heard of anyone doing so since he started working at 
Consol years before.  Additionally, Stern himself evidently 
thought the accident could be fatal, and he said as much by 
asking Smith to pass on his love to his wife and family.   
 
Furthermore, Tennant was called about the accident and 
decided to go to the mine, even though he did not always do so 
after an accident.  He did so in this instance because Stern had 
been caught between two large pieces of equipment.   
 
In short, McDonald, Smith, Tennant, and Stern all had 
reactions to the injury indicating an expectation that the injury 
was life threatening.  On this record, there is certainly “such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support” the finding that Consol possessed 
information that would lead a reasonable mine operator to 
conclude that a reasonable potential for death existed.  
Cumberland Coal, 515 F.3d at 252 (citation omitted).  Consol 
should have called MSHA within the prescribed 15-minute 
window. 
 
None of this is to fault McDonald, Smith, or Tennant 
for how they responded to Stern’s injury.  They reacted quickly 
and commendably to provide effective care to Stern in his 
extremity.  We simply conclude that a reasonable mine 
operator, possessing the information they had, would have 
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believed the incident had a reasonable potential to turn fatal, 
and there was thus an obligation to call MSHA.24 
 
C. The Commission Was Bound by the   
  Mandatory Minimum Penalty 
Consol’s final argument is that the Commission was not 
bound by the $5,000 statutory minimum penalty under 30 
U.S.C. § 820(a)(2) for notification violations.  Again, the 
company is wrong. 
 
Section 820 is the Mine Act’s penalties section.  Under 
subsection (a)(2), “[t]he operator of a coal or other mine who 
fails to provide timely notification to the Secretary as required 
under section 813(j) … (relating to the 15 minute requirement) 
shall be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of not less 
than $5,000 and not more than $60,000.”  30 U.S.C. 
§ 820(a)(2).  And, under subsection (i), “[t]he Commission 
shall have authority to assess all civil penalties provided in this 
chapter.”  Id. § 820(i).  The penalties set out in 
§ 820(a), including the mandatory minimums, are “penalties 
provided in this chapter,” meaning that the Commission is 
bound by those minimums.   
                                              
24 Additionally, and relatedly, our opinion should not be 
read to discourage mine operators from taking precautions 
such as calling for an airlift in the event of a mine injury.  A 
mine operator’s reaction to an injury is, of course, relevant in 
assessing that injury’s reasonably perceived severity.  But, 
under a “totality of the circumstances” approach, a mine 
operator’s reaction to a particular injury is considered 
alongside, inter alia, how the operator has reacted to other, less 
severe injuries. 
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In addition, subsection (a)(4) provides, “If a 
court … sustains [an order imposing a penalty described in this 
subsection], the court shall apply at least the minimum 
penalties required under this subsection.”  Id. § 820(a)(4).  We 
agree with the Commission that, given that language in 
§ 820(a)(4), “[a] statutory scheme that permit[ted] the 
Commission to assess any penalty, however minimal, but 
require[d] a reviewing court to impose a penalty of at least 
$5,000, [would] make[] no sense.”  (App. at 14.) 
 
In sum, the Commission was bound by the mandatory 
minimum set forth in 30 U.S.C. § 820(a)(2), and its conclusion 
in that regard was not erroneous. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
